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Chapter 7: Inequality and Well-Being 
  
Abstract 
In this chapter, Borooah investigates a neglected area in the study of human development relating 
differences in human development between social groups in a country. Failure to take account of such 
inter-group inequalities might lead one to exaggerate a country’s developmental achievements. 
Conversely, one would get a more accurate picture of a country’s achievements with respect to human 
development only after one had taken cognisance of the fact that the fruits of development were 
unequally distributed between its various communities.  There is a further issue. Not only are 
developmental fruits unequally distributed between groups,  but these fruits may be unequally 
distributed within the groups.  In this chapter, Borooah uses the methodology of “equity adjusted 
achievement”  to compute human development indices and “extended” human development indices 
for a number of social groups in India. 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recently observed that 
“Concerns have emerged regarding the fact that macro-economic statistics did not portray the right 
image of what ordinary people perceived about the state of their lives. Addressing these concerns is 
crucial, not just for the credibility and accountability of public services, but for the very functioning of 
our democracies” (OECD, 2011, p. 4). Other economists and non-economists have expressed concern 
that by identifying welfare exclusively in terms of money income, public policy has lost its way. As a 
consequence, there has been — and still is — an undue concentration of both public and private 
resources on raising national income: “undue”, because making people richer does not necessarily 
improve their well-being or, at any rate, not by enough to justify the outlay of resources in raising 
income. In other words, public policy, with its focus on raising national income, may not be giving 
people what they want; for this reason, there is a growing restlessness among social scientists about 
the wisdom of harnessing economic policy to the yoke of economic performance (Frank, 1997, 1999; 
Layard, 2006). 
The United Nations, too, recognises that income is not an end in itself but rather a means to 
achieving the much broader goal of “human development” and that, towards achieving this goal, non-
economic factors — such as levels of crime, the position of women, respect for human rights etc. — 
may, in addition to income, make an important contribution. In order to breathe life into this 
perspective, the UNDP regularly publishes, as part of its annual Human Development Report, a 
ranking of over 100 countries in terms of their values on the Human Development Index (HDI). This 
index, while having GDP performance as one of its components, also takes into account countries’ 
“achievements” with regard to educational (for example, literacy rates) and health-related (for 
example, life expectancy) outcomes.1 “Well-being”, so conceived, may be related to poverty but it is 
also quite distinct from it (Subramanian, 2004). 
The term “human development” is widely used by the media, politicians, NGOs, and 
governments all over the world to mean the capacity of people to fulfil their potential in all the 
domains in which they function — inter alia health, education, and income. This concept of 
development — based on an expansion of capabilities to function in life, in all its variety and richness 
— is arguably a more productive and more expressive view than one based solely on economic 
growth. This is a concept which owes much to the work of, among others, Anand and Sen (1994, 
1997, 2003), Haq (1994), and Sen (1992). The computation of the Human Development Index, and 
the ranking of countries on the basis of their HDI values, have become are regular features of public 
debate since the HDI was first published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 
1995, 2000). Another regular feature of HDI is its calculation on a national (and indeed, sub-national 
basis), in which different regions of a country are ranked on the basis of their human development (for 
example, Shariff, 1999). 
Anand and Sen (1994), in a paper prepared for the 1995 Human Development Report, pointed 
out that a country’s non-economic achievements were likely to be unequally distributed between 
subgroups of its population. For example, in terms of gender equality — which was the focus of their 
                                                     
1 The rankings of the various countries in terms of their per-capita GDP and their HDI index can often be very 
different. If one defines X as the difference between a country’s GDP rank and its HDI rank, then as UNDP 
(2000) shows, X is significantly non-zero for several countries. For example, X=13 for the UK (implying that the 
UK’s HDI ranking was 13 places higher than its GDP ranking) while X=-16 for Luxembourg (implying that 
Luxembourg’s HDI ranking was 16 places lower than its GDP ranking). 
concern — the female literacy rate, or female life expectancy, were often lower than for males. In the 
face of such inter-group inequality, they argued that a country’s achievement with respect to a 
particular outcome should not be judged exclusively by its mean level of achievement (for example, 
by the average literacy rate for a country) but rather by the mean level adjusted to take account of 
inter-group differences in achievements. They proposed a method, based on Atkinson’s (1970) 
seminal work on the relation between social welfare and inequality, for making such adjustments: 
they termed the resulting indicators equity sensitive indicators. This would then allow a comparison 
between two countries, one of which had a lower mean achievement level, but a more equitable 
distribution of achievement, than the other. They further suggested that assessments of country 
achievements should be made on the basis of such equity sensitive indicators rather than, as was often 
the case, on the basis of its mean level of achievement.2  
 A neglected area in the study of human development has been differences in human 
development between social groups in a country. So, for example, one might know the value of the 
HDI for India in its entirety but fail to adjust this value for the fact that India’s achievements with 
respect to the components of the HDI may be unequally distributed between its various social groups: 
a national literacy rate may co-exist with high rates of literacy for upper caste Hindus and low rates 
for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Failure to take account of such inter-group 
inequalities might lead one to exaggerate India’s developmental achievements. Conversely, one would 
get a more accurate picture of India’s achievements with respect to human development only after one 
had taken cognisance of the fact that the fruits of development were unequally distributed between its 
various communities.  
 There is, however, a further issue. Not only are developmental fruits unequally distributed 
between groups — in the sense that, as observed above, inter-group average incomes may differ — 
but these fruits may be unequally distributed within the groups. The former type of inequality is the 
domain of inter-group inequality and the latter type of inequality is the domain of within-group 
                                                     
2 Anand and Sen (1997) compared Honduras (with an average literacy rate of 75%, distributed between men and 
women as 78%, 73%) with China (with an average literacy rate of 80%, distributed between men and women as 
92%, 68%) and asked which country should be regarded as having the “better” achievement with regard to 
literacy: China with a higher overall rate or Honduras with greater gender equality? 
inequality with overall inequality being a composite of between- and within-group inequality. So, 
pursuing the Anand and Sen (1994, 1997) argument to its logical conclusion, a “proper” assessment of 
a country’s achievement with respect to an indicator requires us to take account of inequality not just 
in the distribution of that achievement between its social groups but also, within each group, 
inequality in the distribution of that achievement between the group’s members.3  
 The details of the methodology, expressed in mathematical form, which underpins this 
concept of “equity-adjusted achievement”, are contained in the following two sections. Then, in 
subsequent sections, we use this methodology to compute human development indices and “extended” 
human development indices for a number of social groups in India. As is well known, conventional 
human development indices embody three elements: education (literacy rate); health (life 
expectancy); and income. To this list, we added two further components to arrive at an ‘extended’ 
HDI: living conditions and social networks. Living conditions are important because many 
households in India lack, for example, even basic toilet facilities or ventilation in their cooking area. 
Social networks are important because there is a great volume of, admittedly anecdotal, evidence from 
India to suggest that it is difficult, if not impossible, to access essential services easily unless one has 
personal contacts or, in the vernacular, has jaan-pehchaan.  
The results reported in this chapter are based on data from the India Human Development 
Survey which relates to the period 2011–12 (hereafter, IHDS-2011).4 This is a nationally 
representative, multi-topic panel survey of 42,152 households in 384 districts, 1420 villages and 1042 
urban neighbourhoods across India. Each household in the IHDS-2011 was the subject of two hour-
long interviews. These interviews covered inter alia issues of: health, education, employment, 
economic status, marriage, fertility, gender relations, and social capital. The IHDS-2011, like its 
predecessors for 2005 and 1994, was designed to complement existing Indian surveys by bringing 
together a wide range of topics in a single survey. This breadth permits the analysis of associations 
across a range of social and economic conditions. 
                                                     
3 These “members” could be households or persons. 
4 Desai et al. (2015).  
7.2 Equity Sensitive Achievements 
Suppose that there are N households in a country (with measured achievements, 1 2, ,..., NX X X ), 
which can be separated into K mutually exclusive social groups ( 1...k K= ) with kN  households (
1... ki N= ) in each group, each household with an achievement, , 1... ,  1...ik kX i N k K= = . We know 
that the average achievement of a country is not achieved by all its groups. Similarly, the average 
achievement of a group is not achieved by all its members. In other words, there is inequality in the 
distribution of achievements between groups and between individuals in groups. If, as is the 
convention in economics, we regard inequality as undesirable (a “bad”) then, in assessing the 
achievement of a country or of a group, by how much should we reduce its average achievement to 
take account of inequality in achievements?  
The answer to this question depends on how averse we are to inequality. In his seminal paper on 
income inequality, Atkinson (1970) argued that we (society) would be prepared to accept a reduction 
from a higher average income which was unequally distributed to a lower average income which was 
equally distributed.5 The size of this reduction would depend upon our degree of “inequality 
aversion”, which Atkinson (1970) measured by the value of an “inequality aversion parameter”, 0ε ≥ . 
When 0ε = , we are not at all averse to inequality implying that we would not be prepared to accept 
even the smallest reduction in average income in order to secure an equitable distribution. The degree 
of inequality aversion increases with the value ofε : the higher the value ofε , the more averse we are 
to inequality and the greater the reduction in average income we would find acceptable to secure an 
equal distribution of income. 
These ideas can equally well be applied to the measurement of non-income achievements. We 
can reduce the average achievement, 
1
N
i
i
X X
=
=∑ , of a country by the amount of inter-group 
inequality in achievements to arrive at eX , a “group-equity sensitive” achievement for the country: 
eX X≤ . Similarly, we can reduce the average achievement, kX , of a group by the amount of intra-
                                                     
5 In the language of economics, the two situations would yield the same level of social welfare, i.e. be “welfare 
equivalent”. 
group inequality in achievements to arrive at ekX , a “person-equity sensitive” achievement for the 
group: ek kX X≤ . We refer to
eX  and ekX  as equally distributed equivalent achievements:
eX , when 
it is the achievement of each of the groups (that is, equally distributed between the groups), is welfare 
equivalent to X ; and ekX , when it is the achievement of every member of group k (that is, equally 
distributed between individuals in a group), is welfare equivalent to kX . The size of these reductions 
(as given by the differences: eX X−  and ek kX X− ) depends upon our aversion to inequality: the 
lower our aversion to inequality, the smaller will be the difference; in the extreme case in which there 
is no aversion to inequality, there will be no difference between the average, and the equity sensitive, 
achievements.  
Three special cases, contingent upon the value assumed byε , the inequality aversion 
parameter, can be distinguished: 
1. 0ε =  (no inequality aversion), eX  and ekX  are the arithmetic means of, respectively, the 
group achievements and of the achievements of persons in group k: eX X=  and ek kX X=   
2. 1ε = , eX  and ekX  are the geometric means of, respectively, the group achievements and 
of the achievements of persons in group k: ( )
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3. 2ε = , eX  and ekX  are the harmonic means of, respectively, the group achievements and 
of achievements of persons in group k: 
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A Diagrammatic Analysis 
It may be useful to present the analysis of the preceding paragraphs in diagrammatic terms. Figure 7.1 
portrays a world of two persons (R and S) who are required to “share” an achievement, say a given 
mean wage, W, in terms of their individual wages, WR and WS. The horizontal axis of Figure 7.1 
measures WR and the vertical axis measures WS. The two wages are related to the aggregate wage by 
the “sharing” equation: ( ) / 2R SW W W= +  and this is represented in Figure 7.1 by the “sharing 
possibility line”, MN. The point X, on MN, lies on the 450 line passing through the origin and, so, X is 
the point at which R SW W= .  
<Figure 7.1> 
 Given the mean wage, W, the observed distributional outcome may be viewed as a mapping 
of W to a point on MN which establishes WR and WS. Different outcomes will locate at different 
points of MN. Those that locate closer to the point X (for example, B) will be more egalitarian than 
those (like A) which locate further away. 
 If every person is assigned the same concave utility function U(.), then ( )iU W is the utility 
that person i (i=R,S) obtains from a wage of iW and ‘social welfare’, denoted by Q, is defined as the 
sum of the utilities of all the children: 
 ( ) ( )R SQ U W U W= +   (7.1) 
 The curves QQ and Q′ Q′ represent indifference curves associated with the welfare function 
of equation (7.1), the higher curve (QQ) representing a higher level of utility than the lower curve (Q′ 
Q′) and these welfare indifference curves are superimposed upon the sharing possibility line.6  Since 
the utility functions (.)U  in equation (7.1) are assumed to be concave (that is, embodying the property 
of diminishing marginal utility), social welfare is maximised when R SW W=  that is, when both 
receive the same wage.7 Consequently, X is the point at which welfare is maximised and is the point at 
which the indifference curve, QQ, is tangential to the sharing possibility line, MN. The distribution, 
however, delivers an outcome at point A at which person R receives a higher wage ( RW OF=  ) and 
person S a lower score ( SW AF= ).  The outcome at point A is welfare equivalent to that at point C at 
                                                     
6 An indifference curve shows the different combinations of ,R SW W  which yield the same level of welfare. It is 
obtained by holding Q constant in equation (7.1) and solving for the different ,R SW W which yield this value of 
Q. 
7 Because of concavity, an egalitarian transfer from R to S will increase welfare: the gain in utility to S will 
exceed the loss to R. Welfare will be maximised when no further net gain is possible, that is, when R SW W=  . 
which both persons receive the same score ( R SW W CD= = ). CD is then defined as the equally 
distributed equivalent (ede) wage.  
<Figure 7.2> 
 The value of the inequality aversion parameter, ε determines the curvature of the indifference 
curves. The larger the value of ε, the more ‘bow-shaped’ will be the indifference curve and the 
smaller the value of ε, the flatter will be the indifference curve. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2 in 
which QQ and W′W′ represent, respectively, indifference curves associated with low and high values 
of ε. Both curves pass through the point A on the sharing possibility line MN but CD, the equity 
sensitive score associated with QQ (lowε), is greater than C′D′, the ede score associated with Q′Q′ 
(high ε). 
7.3. A Formal Analysis of Equity-Sensitive Indicators 
More formally, social welfare, W, is defined as the sum of the concave group utility functions ( )kF X  
so that:  
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 The change in welfare following a change in the kX  is: 
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Where: 
( ) 0,kk
k
F Xa
X
∂
= >
∂
 is the marginal change in social welfare consequent upon changes in group 
achievements ( kX∆ ) and also termed the “welfare weight” associated with group k. Since it is 
assumed that the functions F(.) are strictly concave, marginal gain decreases with increasing 
achievements: consequently, social welfare is maximised when achievements are equal across groups 
: 1 2 ... KX X X= = = . 
The social welfare function, W, in equation (7.2) has constant elasticity if, for ε>0, F(.) can be 
written as: 
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. Consequently, the percentage 
change in the welfare weight, ka , associated with group k, following an increase in its achievement, 
kX , is constant and negative. The larger the value of the parameter 0ε > , the greater will be the fall 
in the welfare weight.  
Similarly, the social welfare of a group , 1...kW k K=  is defined as the sum of the concave 
utility functions of the group’s members, ( )kF X  so that: 
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Implying: 
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∆ = ∆∑ where the welfare weights, ika  are defined as:
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∂
. 
The social welfare function, Wk, in equation (7.4) has constant elasticity if, for ε>0, F(.) can 
be written as: 
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  (7.6) 
Since eX  is welfare equivalent to X  and since ekX  is welfare equivalent to 
e
kX  we have 
Atkinson’s inequality index, I, derived as8:  
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where, in equation (7.7), I represents the overall index and Ik represents the inequality index for group 
k.  
 From equation (7.7): 
                                                     
8 Since, by welfare equivalence of  and eX X
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 From equation (7.8): 
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 Equation (7.9) represents what Anand and Sen (1994) refer to as “(1-ε) averaging)”: the 
overall equally distributed equivalent achievement, eX is a weighted average, with exponent 1 ε− , of 
the group equally distributed equivalent achievements,  ( 1... )ekX k K= .  
A special case occurs when 0ε =  (no inequality aversion). In that situation, eX  and ekX  
are the arithmetic means of, respectively, the group achievements and of the achievements of persons 
in group k: eX X=  and ek kX X= . When 0ε >  (there is positive inequality aversion), 
eX X<  and
e
k kX X< . 
The Welfare Effects of Redistribution 
To examine the welfare effects of an inter-group redistribution of achievements, consider two social 
groups — Hindus (k=C) and Muslims (k=D) — and suppose that, within the context of a fixed overall 
achievement X , there is a redistribution of achievements (say, income) from Hindus towards 
Muslims. Then this implies that  
 0 ( / ) ,  : 0, 0C C D D C C D D D C DX n X n X X n n X X where X Xθ∆ = ∆ + ∆ = ⇒ −∆ = = ∆ ∆ < ∆ >   (7.10) 
The change in social welfare that results from this redistribution is: 
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Setting ∆W=0 in equation (7.10) yields: 
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where:  1 and =C D
D C
X N
X N
λ θ= > . 
 Suppose that through appropriate redistribution policies, the achievement (income) of 
Muslims is increased by one unit. If 0ε = , from equation (7.11), in order to keep the overall 
achievement, X , unchanged, the achievement (income) of Hindus must fall by CX θ∆ = . If the fall in 
the achievement of Hindus exceeded θ, then that would lower the overall achievement X and, 
therefore, overall welfare, W.  
Since, if 0ε > CX
ελ θ θ∆ = > , the achievement of upper-caste Hindus can fall by more than 
θ — the amount required to keep X unchanged — and still keep welfare unchanged. In other words, 
for 0ε > , society would be prepared to tolerate a fall in the overall achievement ( 0X∆ < ) in order to 
redistribute from Hindus to Muslims, leaving overall welfare unchanged. The greater the value ofε, 
the greater will be this tolerance. 
6.4 The Equity --Sensitive Human Development Index: Theory 
Given a list of M achievement indicators (indexed, j=1…M) — hereafter referred to as, simply, 
“indicators” — a country’s performance index (PI) with respect to indicator j, Aj, is defined as  
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X Min X
A
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−
= ×
−
  (7.13) 
Where jA  is the PI of a country in respect of achievement j (j=1,2,.., M), jX is the value of indicator j 
and { }jMax X and { }jMin X are, respectively, the maximum and minimum values of the indicator.  
 Equation (7.13) implies that 0 100,  1...jA j M≤ ≤ =  so that Aj represents the percentage 
performance of the country with respect to the jth indicator. The overall performance of the country is 
then the value of its Human Development Index (HDI) and this is defined as the average of the M 
performance indices: 
 
1
1 M
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j
HDI A
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= ∑   (7.14) 
 This section applies the idea of the HDI to a situation where the population of a country is 
subdivided into K mutually exclusive groups indexed k=1…K.  For every household in each group, 
we compute the value of its PI in respect of M indicators where these are represented by
,  1... ;  1.... ;  and 1...jkh kA j M k K h H= = = , where Hk is the number of households in group k. So, for 
any group k (k=1…K) and indicator j (j=1…M), the components of the vector 
1 2( , ,... )kj k jk j kHA A A=jkA  represents the distribution of the PI with respect to indicator j over the Hk 
households in group k. We can then define by ejkA  the equally distributed equivalent performance 
index, or EDEPI, of group k with respect to indicator j as the (1-ε) average — as defined in equation 
(7.9) — of the PI of the groups’ households: 
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 When ε=0, ejkA  is the arithmetic mean of the household PI; when ε >0, 
e
jkA  is less than the 
arithmetic mean of the households’ PI.  
The overall EDEPI for group k, k=1…K is: 
 1 2
1 1 1...e e e ek k k MkA A A AM M M
= + + +   (7.16) 
 
The EDEPI aggregated over all the households in all the groups, with respect to attainment j, 
and taking account of both within and between group inequalities, is denoted ejA  where: 
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where: 
1
K
k
k
H H
=
=∑  is the total number of households in the country. 
The overall EDE performance index over all the groups, taking account of both inter- and 
intra-group inequality is: 
 ( )1 21 ...e e e eMA A A AM= + + +   (7.18) 
The Decomposition of the Human Development Index 
Setting ε=0 in equation (7.17) and using equation (7.15) yields: 
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If within-group inequalities are ignored then, in each group, every household is assumed to 
have the mean PI of that group: jhk jkA A=  , h=1…Hk, (for i=1…M and k=1,…K). The only inequality 
is between group inequality resulting from the fact that the mean PI of the groups, with respect to 
indicator j, are different: 1 2 ....j j jKA A A≠ ≠ ≠  The equally distributed equivalent performance 
indicator (EDEPI), aggregated over all the groups, with respect to attainment i, taking account of 
between group inequalities only, is denoted ejB where: 
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where: nk is the proportion of households in group k, k=1..K. Then: 
 The overall EDEPI over all the households in all groups, taking account of only inter-group 
inequality is: 
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When ε=0, so that there is no aversion to between-group inequality, ej jB B= where 
1
K
j k jk
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=∑  is the mean of the PI of the indicator j computed over households in all the groups. In 
this case, equation (7.21) becomes: 
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 which is, in fact, the HDI defined in equation (7.14). The B  in equation (7.22) or, equivalently, the 
HDI in equation (7.14) is a special case of eA in equation (7.18) and obtains when both inter- and 
intra-group inequality in the distribution of the PI between the households in the country is ignored. 
6.5 The Human Development Index: Practicalities 
In practical terms, the Human Development Index (HDI) has been formulated in terms of a country’s 
shortfall in respect of three “dimensions”: living standards, education, and health. Suppose that X, Y, 
and Z are the values of a country’s performance indices with respect to each of these three dimensions 
and suppose that Max(X), Max(Y), and Max(Z) are the maximum — and Min(X), Min(Y), and Min(Z) 
are the minimum — values of these achievements. For example, per-capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) is used as a surrogate for living standards with the assumption, say, that Max(X)=$40,000 and 
Min(Z)=$100; if Y, the literacy rate in a country, is used as a surrogate for the education dimension 
then Max(Y)=100 and Min(Y)=0; if Z, the life expectancy at birth is used as a surrogate for the health 
dimension then (it is assumed) Max(Z)=85 and Min(Z)=25.  
Following from this, the index for each achievement is defined as: 
   – 10     
 –
0
   
Observed value Minimum valuePerformance Index
Maximum value Minimum value
×=   
and the HDI is defined as: 
 
3
X Y ZIndex Index IndexHDI + +=   
  Now suppose that there are two groups. If we consider the performance index (PI) with 
respect to income,9 households within each group will have different PI values and this will yield the 
group’s average PI value: suppose 1X  represents group 1’s average PI value and 2X  represents group 
2’s average PI value.10 The PI value for each group represents the average distance between its actual 
income and its potential income: so, for example, PI=65 for a group means that, on average, it fulfils 
65% of its income potential.  
One can compute, for each group, its equally distributed equivalent performance index 
(EDEPI) with respect to income by taking account of income inequality between the households in the 
                                                     
9 That is,   -  
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Observed Income Minimum IncomeIndex
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=
−
  
10 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the average will always be taken to be the arithmetic mean. 
groups: these are denoted 1 2 and 
e eX X . By definition: 1 1 2 2 and 
e eX X X X≤ ≤  with equality holding if, 
and only if, there was no aversion to inequality (ε=0) in computing the EDEPI for income. As shown 
in the previous section, the 1 2 and 
e eX X  are calculated through a process of “ (1 )ε− averaging”, 
described in equations (6.9) and (6.15). In addition to computing eX , we can also compute the EDEPI 
for education (the literacy rate) for groups 1 and 2 as, 1 2 and 
e eY Y and the EDEPI for health (life 
expectancy) as 1 2 and 
e eZ Z , and having done so, contrast them with their corresponding average 
values, 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , ,  and X X Y Y Z Z . 
      Following from this, one can compute the conventional and equity sensitive HDI for each group k 
(k=1,2) — respectively,  and avg eqsk kHDI HDI  — as: 
  and 
3 3
e e e
avg eqsk k k k k k
k k
X Y Z X Y ZHDI HDI+ + + += =   
This is equation (7.15), above.  
 After this, the EDE index values for the country can be computed, with respect to each of the 
three achievements, by aggregating across the groups. Doing so takes account of inequality in the 
distribution of the values of income over all the households in the country: in other words, both 
inequality between groups and inequality within groups are taken into account in computing the 
country’s EDEPI with respect to income. This is represented by eX  where eX X≤ and the gap 
between  and eX X , the average achievement value for the country, depends upon our aversion to 
inequality (in the extreme case, when there is no aversion to inequality, eX X= ). Similarly, we 
compute eY  (EDEPI for the literacy rate) and eZ (EDEPI for life expectancy).11 
 Following from this, one can compute the conventional and equity sensitive HDI for the 
country — respectively,  and avg eqsHDI HDI — as: 
  and 
3 3
e e e
avg eqsX Y Z X Y ZHDI HDI+ + + += =   
This is equation (7.18).  
                                                     
11 As earlier, we use the technique of “1-ε averaging” as set out in equation (2.16).  
Alternatively, one could ignore within group inequality by assuming that every household in a 
group earns that group’s average income. On this assumption, the country’s EDE achievement with 
respect to the income index is represented as eBX  where 
e
BX X≤ and the gap between  and 
e
BX X , the 
average achievement value, depends upon our aversion to inequality (in the extreme case, when there 
is no aversion to inequality, eBX X= ).  Following from this, the conventional and equity sensitive 
HDI for the country, respectively,  and avg eqsBHDI HDI , only taking account of between group 
inequality, are computed as, by equation (7.20): 
  and 
3 3
e e e
avg eqs B B B
B
X Y ZX Y ZHDI HDI + ++ += =   
6.6. Data and Analysis: the component indices 
The data for the analysis were provided by the household file of the IHDS-2011 which contained 
information, pertaining to 2011, on over 42,000 households in India. Using these data, the households 
were divided into the following mutually exclusive groups: Scheduled Tribe (ST), Scheduled Caste 
(SC), non-Muslim Other Backward Classes (NMOBC), Muslims, non-Muslim Upper Classes 
(NMUC). These comprised, respectively, 8.2%, 21.8%, 35.9%, 11.4% and 22.7% of the sample of 
households.12 
 The conventional HDI has, as discussed in the previous section, three dimensions: living 
standards (with GDP as the surrogate), education (with the literacy rate as the surrogate), and health 
(with life expectancy as the surrogate). Since the analysis reported in this chapter builds up the HDI 
from the level of the household, taking account of inter- and intra-group inequality, it uses surrogates 
at the household, rather than at the national, level: household per-capita consumption expenditure 
(PCE) for living standards and the highest level of education, measured by years of education, of 
household adult(s) for education.13 So as to eliminate extreme values, the maximum and minimum 
                                                     
12 All figures reported in this chapter were obtained after grossing up the sample using the household weights 
provided in IHDS-2011. 
13 Defined as: 0 (none), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (5th standard), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (Matric), 11, 12 (Higher Secondary), 13, 14, 15, 16 
(Graduate or above). 
values of household PCE were taken as the mean values for households in the 95th and 5th quintile of 
PCE: these were, respectively, ₹68,195 and ₹7,368. 
 In order to capture more fully the well-being of households, and of the social groups to which 
they belonged, two further dimensions were added. The first of these was the households’ living 
conditions. The IHDS-2011 reported on the living conditions of the households with respect to a 
number of items from which this study chose seven, scoring as 1 if the household possessed that item 
and 0 if it did not: (i) a toilet in their dwelling; (ii) a separate kitchen; (iii) a vent in the cooking place; 
(iv) a pucca roof; (v) a pucca floor; (vi) electricity; (vii) water supply in the dwelling or its 
compound.14 Thus the maximum and minimum scores score for a household were 7 (it possessed all 
seven items) and 0 (it possessed none of these items) and the PI for a household, with respect to living 
conditions, was: [observed score/7]×100. 
 Nearly 83% of households had electricity; the next most commonly possessed housing 
amenity (73% of households) was a vent in the cooking area; this was followed by a pucca roof and 
floor (respectively, 64% and 59% of households); the least common amenities were a toilet (53% of 
households), a separate kitchen (55% of households), and water supply within the precincts of the 
dwelling (51% of households).   
 The second additional dimension was social networks. These are important because there is 
evidence (Bros-Bobbin and Borooah, 2013) that it is difficult in India, if not impossible, to easily 
access public services unless one ‘knows someone’ or, in the vernacular, has jaan-pehchaan.15 The 
IHDS-2011 reported on the social networks of each household with respect to a number of indicators 
designed to measure the range, quality, and the closeness of social contacts. The basic questions were: 
(i) do you know a person of type X as part of your relatives/caste/community? (ii) If the answer to (i) 
is no, do you know a person of type X outside your relatives/caste/community? Type X was 
represented by five professions: (a) doctor; (b) principal/teacher; (c) government officer; (d) elected 
politician; (e) police inspector.  
                                                     
14 The roof and floor could be: ‘kutcha’ (grass, mud, thatch, wood, tile, slate for the roof; mud or wood for the 
floor); or ‘pucca’ (asbestos, metal, brick, stone, concrete for the roof; brick, stone, cement, tiles for the floor). 
15 Indeed, in the words of a well-known Hindi song (also used to sell Heineken beer): jaan-pehchaan hai, jeena 
asaan hai (living is easy because I know people).  
 In this study, a positive answer by a household to question (i) was scored as 2; a positive 
answer to question (ii) was scored as 1; and a score of 0 was assigned to any household that did not 
know any type X person whether from within its relatives/caste/community or outside. Consequently, 
the maximum and minimum scores for a household with respect to social networks were 5 (a 
household knew all five types of persons — doctor, teacher, government officer, elected politician, 
police inspector — as part of its relatives/caste/community) and 0 (a household did not know any of 
these five types whether as part of, or outside, its relatives/caste/community: the PI for a household, 
with respect to social networks was, therefore, [observed score/5]×100. 
 The IHDS-2011 showed that the two professions with which households were most 
acquainted were doctors and teachers: of the sampled households, 20% and 31% knew a doctor and a 
teacher, respectively, as part of their relatives/caste/community. This acquaintance was unevenly 
distributed between the social groups: 31% of NMUC households — compared to only 12% of ST 
households, 15% of SC households, 17% of NMOBC households, and 25% of Muslim households — 
knew a doctor, while 44% of NMUC — compared to only 28% of ST households, 24% of SC 
households, 27% of NMOBC households, and 32% of Muslim households — knew a 
teacher/principal.  
 The least known types were government officers, elected politicians, and police inspectors: 
only 9%, 9%, and 6%, respectively, knew persons of these types as part of their 
relatives/caste/community. Of households knowing a government officer, 42% and 28% belonged to 
respectively, the NMUC and to the NMOBC; of households knowing an elected politician, 35% and 
29% belonged to respectively, the NMUC and to the NMOBC; of households knowing a police 
inspector, 36% and 30% belonged to respectively, the NMUC and to the NMOBC. Thus, while not 
many households could claim to know government officers, elected politicians, or police inspectors as 
part of their relatives/caste/community, those that could were drawn overwhelmingly from the ranks 
of the NMUC and the NMOBC. 
<Table7.1> 
  Table 7.1 shows the PI values of each group with respect to the five dimensions of the HDI: 
living standards; education; life expectancy; living conditions; and social networks. The first number 
in each column is the mean value for each group: this does not adjust for within-group inequality in 
the distribution of household PI or, in other words, is based on zero aversion to inequality. In terms of 
the algebra, this number is derived from equation (7.15) with ε=0. The number immediately below 
this, enclosed in [ ] in Table 7.1, represents the equally distributed equivalent performance index 
(EDEPI): the mean values reported are adjusted downwards to take account of inter-household 
inequality within each group. In terms of the algebra, this number is derived from equation (7.15) with 
ε=0.5, that is with mild inequality aversion.  
 Table 7.1 shows that, for every dimension, households from the NMUC had the highest, 
while households from the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Castes had the lowest, PI values. 
Taking account of inter-household inequality reduced the PI below its mean value. These falls were 
most marked for the SC and Muslims in terms of education and social networks. The SC have their 
privileged sub-castes whereby the benefits of reservation in terms of jobs and education are captured 
by a “creamy layer”.16 Muslims, too, have their own privileged groups. The Sachar Committee Report 
(2006) refers to the caste system applying also to Muslims: Muslims who were converts to Islam from 
the higher castes were ashraf (meaning “noble”) and regarded as high-born Muslims, while converts 
to Islam from the lower castes were ajlaf (meaning “degraded” or “unholy”). As Trivedi et al. (2016) 
report, there is little social interaction between the two Muslim “castes”. The existence of privileged 
subgroups among deprived groups implies that when allowance is made for intra-group inequality, the 
values of EDEPI for deprived groups are considerably lower than their corresponding mean values. 
The SC and Muslims are not only deprived but their deprivation is also compounded by the fact that 
their attainments are unfairly skewed in favour of a privileged few among them. 
Aggregation over Social Groups 
In order to obtain the group achievements in respect of the dimensions — living standards, education, 
life expectancy, living conditions, and social networks — one needs to aggregate over all the 
households in each group, using the method of “1-ε averaging” of equation (7.15), in order to obtain 
                                                     
16 The term “creamy layer” is used here loosely to apply to SC/ST/and Muslims. Strictly speaking, in the Indian 
legal context, it applies only to the OBC. 
the values of performance index of each group (shown in Table 7.1) in respect of that component. If 
the performance index of group k (k=1…) with respect to living standards, education, life expectancy, 
living conditions, and social networks are represented by, respectively, PILSk, PIEDk, PILEk, PILCk, 
and PISNk , then from equation (7.17), the Human Development Index (HDIk) of each group k, over 
the five dimensions, is defined as: 
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 These HDI values are shown in Table 7.2. If one interprets a group’s HDI value as the 
percentage fulfilment of its “potential”, then the numbers in Table 7.2 show that, in terms of overall 
human development, households in the NMUC collectively fulfilled 58.9% of their potential when 
intra-household inequality was ignored and 53.5% of their potential when intra-household inequality 
was taken into account. In contrast, Muslims and NMOBC households fulfilled around 45% of their 
potential when intra-household inequality was ignored and 39% of their potential when intra-
household inequality was taken into account. Bringing up the rear, ST and SC households fulfilled 
around 35% of their potential when intra-household inequality was ignored and around 30% of their 
potential when intra-household inequality was taken into account.  
<Table 7.2> 
The all-India performance index values for each of the five indicators were shown in Table 
7.1, under the column labelled all households, both when intra-household inequality (over all the 
households in India) was ignored (ε=0) and when it was taken into account (ε=0.5). Using these 
values, equation (7.18) defines the all-India HDI as: 
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These all-India values are shown in Table 7.2 as 44.0 (for ε=0) and 39.5 (for ε=0.5). 
7.7 Explaining Intra-Household Variation in Performance Indices 
The analysis of the preceding sections highlighted the fact that the performance indices (PI) were 
unequally distributed between households. The components of the vector 1 2( , ,... )j j NjA A A=jA
represent the distribution of the PI with respect to indicator j over the N households (indexed, i=1…N) 
in the sample. In the preceding analysis, the sample was divided into five social groups and 
differences between them, in the average value of their performance indices for each of five 
indicators, were examined.  
 These differences, which were shown in Table 7.1, raise three questions. The first and 
obvious question to ask is whether the numerical differences observed in Table 7.1 were also 
statistically significant? The second question follows from the observation that households differ in 
terms of more than just social group membership. For example, different households live in different 
regions of India; some households reside in rural areas, others are urban residents; households also 
differ in their principal source of income — some earn their living as agricultural workers, others are 
salaried employees. The second question is, therefore, whether factors, other than social group, might 
also have a role in explaining intra-household variation in values of the performance indices? In order 
to accommodate this possibility, this chapter postulates a relationship between the values of a 
household’s performance index with respect to indicator j, represented by Aij for household i (i=1…N) 
and its social group, represented by the variable Si, its region,17 represented by the variable Ri, its 
location as an urban/rural resident, represented by the variable Ui, and its principal source of 
income,18 represented by the variable, Vi. The econometric equations were, therefore, represented by a 
system of four equations (one for each of the indicators education, consumption, living conditions, 
and social networks), indexed j=1..4: 
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17The regions were defined as: North (comprising the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Punjab [including Chandigarh], and Uttarakhand); the Centre (Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh); the East (Assam, Orissa, West Bengal, and the North-Eastern states); 
the West (Gujarat and Maharashtra); and the South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu).  
18 The principal sources of income were: Cultivation & Allied Agriculture; Agricultural Wage Labour; Non-
agricultural Wage Labour; Artisan/Petty Shopkeeper; Organised Business/Salaried/Profession; 
Pension/Rent/Others. 
 The Xil in equation (7.23) represent values of L explanatory variables (l=1…L) for household 
i (i=…N). In the empirical work reported below, the explanatory variables were Si (social group), Ri 
(region), Ui (urban/rural), and Vi (principal source of income). The four equations were estimated as a 
system using the method of seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) due to Zellner (1962, 
1963). 
 The third question relates to the interaction between a household’s social group and the other 
variables. Does the effect of a household’s region on its performance index (with respect to a 
particular indicator) depend upon the social group to which it belongs? If it does, then there is a 
statistical interaction between a household’s region and its social group. Suppose there are two social 
groups, Hindus and Muslims, and that the variable Mi takes the value 1 if a household is Muslim and 
0 if it is Hindu. Then interaction between social group and the other variables means that the 
estimated equation is:  
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  Equation (7.24) shows that the coefficient associated with variable k in the context of a 
Muslim household (that is, Mi =1) is ( )jl jlβ α+ while the coefficient associated with the same 
variable in the context of a Hindu household (that is, Mi =0) is jlβ : in terms of the estimated 
coefficients, jlα represents, therefore, the change in variable l’s contribution to the performance index 
(for indicator j) in moving from a Muslim to a non-Muslim household. Consequently, a test of 
whether the interaction model is valid is to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients jlα are zero: if 
this hypothesis is rejected for a number of the jlα — as it was for the SURE coefficients of equation 
(7.24) — then it would be reasonable to have the social group variables interacting with the other 
variables.  
<Table 7.3> 
Table 7.3 shows the values of the predicted performance index (PPI), based on SURE 
estimates over data for 37,247 households, for each social group, first on an all-India basis and then 
separately for the five regions. The PPI values were computed using the method of “recycled 
predictions”, described in chapter 2, which isolates the effect on the households’ PPI of their 
belonging to different social groups. First, “pretend” that all the 37,247 households are from the SC. 
Holding the values of the other variables constant (either to their observed sample values, as in this 
chapter, or to their mean values), predict the values of the PI for each household (for a specific 
indicator) under this all-SC scenario and denote it SCp . Then SCp represents the predicted performance 
index (PPI) for SC households. Next, “pretend” that all the 37,247 households are Muslim and, again 
holding the values of the other variables constant, predict the values of the PI for each household (for 
a specific indicator) under this all-Muslim scenario and denote it Mp . Then Mp represents the 
predicted performance index (PPI) for Muslim households.  
 Since the values of the other variables were unchanged between these two hypothetical 
scenarios, the only difference between them is that, in the first scenario, the SC variable is “switched 
on” (with the variables pertaining to the other groups “switched off”) — while, in the other, the 
Muslim variable is “switched on” (with the variables pertaining to the other groups “switched off”) — 
for all households.19 Consequently, the difference between SCp and Mp is entirely due to differences 
between SC and Muslims. In essence, therefore, in evaluating the effect of two characteristics X and Y 
on the likelihood of a particular outcome, the method of “recycled predictions” compares two 
outcomes, first, under an “all have the characteristic X” scenario and, then, under an “all have the 
characteristic Y” scenario. The values of the other variables remain unchanged between the scenarios. 
The difference between the two probabilities could then be ascribed to the attribute represented by X 
and Y (in this case, SC and Muslim).20  
  The columns of Table 7.3 headed ‘PPI’ show the PPI values for the five social groups, first 
on an all-India basis and then for each of the five regions. The all-India values were computed using 
the method of “recycled predictions”, discussed above, by assuming that all the 37,247 households in 
the estimation sample belonged, successively, to each of the five social groups, with the values of the 
other variables unchanged. The regional values were also computed using the method of “recycled 
                                                     
19 In operational terms, STATA’s margin command will perform these calculations taking into account all 
interaction effects. 
20 For example, (i) X: all households are SC; Y: all households are Muslim; (ii) X: all households live in the 
North; Y: all households live in the East. 
predictions” but this time assuming that all the 37,247 households in the estimation sample lived in a 
particular region (say, the North) and, in conjunction with this assumption, belonged, successively, to 
each of the five social groups, with the values of all the other variables unchanged. 
 With households from the NMUC as the reference group, the numbers under the column MPI 
(“marginal performance index”) represent the differences between the PPI of a social group and that 
of the reference group. For example, the all-India PPI for education was 48.2 for the ST and 64.7 for 
the NMUC yielding an MPI for the ST of 48.2-64.7 =-16.5. The associated number under the column 
headed SE (standard error) shows the standard error associated with the MPI. For the ST, this was 
0.79. Dividing the MPI by its SE yields a z-value of 20.9 (not shown in the table) and this implied that 
the MPI was significantly different from zero. In other words, the education PPI was significantly 
lower for ST households compared to households from the NMUC.    
  A similar result emerges for the other social groups with respect to all the indicators. As the 
other columns of Table 7.3 show, the PPI for households from the NMUC was significantly higher 
than the PPI for households from the other social groups in respect of: per-capita consumers’ 
expenditure; living conditions; and social networks. In other words, compared to households from the 
other social groups, households from the NMUC were, on average, significantly more likely to fulfil 
their potential in respect of education, living standards, living conditions, and social networks. This 
statement was true not just for India in its entirety but for all its regions considered separately — the 
North, the Centre, the East, the West, and the South. 
 There was no significant difference between Muslim and SC households in their PPI for 
education (respectively, 49.4 and 50.3) but the education PPI for both groups was significantly lower 
than that for NMOBC households (55.9). In terms of per-capita consumption, however, the PPI for 
Muslim households (31.4%) was significantly higher than that for the SC (27.5) but was significantly 
lower than that for NMOBC households (34.3).  
 In terms of living standards, however, the PPI of Muslim households (72.9) was significantly 
higher than that of SC (65.4) and of NMOBC (70.9) households and, in large part, this was explained 
by the fact that Muslim households were more likely to have a toilet than households from the other 
groups: 67% of Muslim households had a toilet compared to 39% of SC, and 48% of NMOBC, 
households. The results for social networks mirrored that for living conditions: the PPI of Muslim 
households (24.0) was significantly higher than that of SC (20.4) and of NMOBC (21.5) households. 
In large part, this was explained by the fact that Muslim households were more likely to know a 
doctor or a teacher as a part of relatives/caste/community than households from the other groups: 25% 
of Muslim households knew a doctor as a part of relatives/caste/community compared to 15% of SC, 
and 17% of NMOBC, households and 32% of Muslim households knew a teacher as a part of 
relatives/caste/community compared to 24% of SC, and 27% of NMOBC, households. 
<Table 7.4> 
 Table 7.3 compared differences between social groups from both an all-India and a regional 
perspective. Table 7.4, on the other hand, compares differences between regions from both an all-
India and a social group perspective. This table shows that, in terms of three indicators — education, 
per-capita consumption, and living conditions — the PPI was significantly lower in the Central region 
and highest in the North, South, and the West. Not only that: households from every social group had 
a significantly lower PPI in the Central region than they did in other regions. For example, in terms of 
education, Muslim and SC households had a PPI of 41.8 and 42.7, respectively, in the Central region 
versus 57.7 and 54.6, respectively in the South. Similarly, in terms of education, households from the 
non-Muslim upper class had a PPI of 63.2 in the Central region compared to 66.7 in the South.   
7.8 Conclusions 
The novelty of the results presented in this chapter is two-fold. First, by accounting for inequality both 
within and between social groups, they extend the analysis of mean performance to include equity 
sensitive human development indices. Second, by including living conditions and social networks, the 
results go beyond the conventional catalogue of human development indicators — education, life 
expectancy, and income — to encompass, arguably, a fuller view of well-being.  
  A persistent, and worrying, feature of the results is that they shows greater intra-group 
inequality within marginalised and deprived groups — the SC, the ST, and Muslims — than among 
the “privileged” NMUC. For example, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of the education PI 
among households in the different subgroups was 0.221 for the NMUC but 0.408 for Muslims, 0.405 
for the SC, and 0.458 for the ST. Similarly, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of the per-capita 
consumption PI among households in the different subgroups was 0.492 for the NMUC but 0.525 for 
Muslims, 0.514 for the SC, and 0.596 for the ST.   
 This raises issues of the existence of a “creamy layer” among the deprived groups — the 
relatively wealthy members of such groups whose existence only serves to highlight the poverty of 
those not in this prosperous category.21 The existence of such a “creamy layer” implies that when 
allowance is made for intra-group inequality, the equally distributed index values for deprived groups 
are considerably lower than their corresponding mean values. Not only are the SC/ST/Muslims 
deprived, but their poverty is compounded by the fact that such prosperity as might exist among them 
is captured by a privileged few among their number. 
 The approach that policy makers in India have taken to overcome the economic and 
social “backwardness” of the SC and the ST has been two-pronged: 
 (a) specific measures to combat disparity, including legal safeguards against 
discrimination in education and employment and the practice of untouchability; 
 (b) general measures for the economic and social development of all persons, including 
persons from the SC and ST. 
These policies have, undeniably, brought about improvements but, as our analysis shows, 
there is considerable distance between the development levels of SC, ST, and Muslim 
households on the one hand, and NMUC households on the other. Like other economically and 
educationally backward sections from the higher castes, the SC, ST, and Muslims require education 
and skill development to improve their economic prospects. But, unlike other deprived persons, they 
face economic and social exclusion and, therefore, require additional protection in the form of anti-
discriminatory measures. However, the existence of “exclusion-induced” deprivation means that 
addressing issues of economic and social exclusion is often more difficult than addressing material 
poverty. Social and cultural sources of exclusion are rooted in “custom and practice”; they include the 
practice of untouchability based on caste, and hostility towards Muslims based on history. In this 
                                                     
21 See note 16. The term creamy layer as used here is applied to SC/ST/ and Muslims. Strictly speaking, in the 
Indian legal context, it applies only to the OBC.  
context, efforts to effect the inclusion of groups which are stigmatised faces the special difficulty of 
combating actions sanctioned by religion, culture, custom, and practice.  
A final word about inequality.  In the past two decades India has known unprecedented rates 
of economic growth with a GDP growth rate of 6.3% in 2017 “disappointing” by earlier standards.  
As Deaton (2013) points out, inequality is often the consequence of progress: “not everyone gets rich 
at the same time” (p.1).  This can be good if inequality spurs those who have been left behind to catch 
up with those ahead through say, acquiring education and skills, or migrating from the countryside to 
towns and cities where the better jobs are located.  In this case, inequality is a transient phenomenon 
accompanying the more durable prize of economic and social progress.  
However, inequality can be bad if those who have succeeded attempt to prevent others from 
doing so. Then inequality becomes entrenched and leads to unrest among those who are left behind 
and see little hope of catching up. There is danger, however, that this may be the case in India with 
the rich and poor leading separate lives with no bridges between them.  As Rao (2017) has pointed 
out, “opting out of the public hospitals and government schools that they once used and benefited 
from, the privileged and middle classes have made their own arrangements to meet their daily needs 
by setting up private hospitals, private insurance, private schools” (p. xviii).   Establishing ladders 
that enable all citizens of India to climb the wall of economic and social progress is one of the most 
important challenges facing modern India. 
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Table 7.1: Household Performance Indices by Social Group 
 All 
households 
Scheduled 
Tribes 
Scheduled 
Castes 
OBC 
Hindus 
Muslims Non-Muslim 
Upper Class 
Per-capita Consumption 30.3 
[26.2] 
17.4 
[17.3] 
21.1 
[19.2] 
29.8 
[25.3] 
24.7 
[21.6] 
47.1 
[40.2] 
 Education 49.9 
[41.5] 
37.2 
[26.9] 
41.3 
[32.2] 
49.6 
[41.3] 
42.2 
[32.8] 
66.9 
[62.0] 
Life Expectancy (years) 50.1 
[50.1] 
40.8 
[40.8] 
35.0 
[35.0] 
50.5 
[50.5] 
57.3 
[57.3] 
63.7 
[63.7] 
Living Conditions 68.1 
[66.3] 
 
45.5 
[43.2] 
60.5 
[59.5] 
68.1 
[64.9] 
71.5 
[70.5] 
80.7 
[80.5] 
Social Networks 21.5 
[13.5] 
18.0 
[10.4] 
17.1 
[9.2] 
19.7 
[12.4] 
21.1 
[13.5] 
30.1 
[21.0] 
The Performance Index (PI) is defined as [(Observed value – Maximum Value)/(Maximum value – Minimum Value]×100 
The first numbers in each column represent the mean value of the PI for each group. These ignore within-group inequality. 
The numbers in [ ] take account of within-group inequality: they represent the equally distributed equivalent PI when the 
inequality aversion parameter, ε=0.5. 
The value of the PI for each group represents the average distance between its observed achievement and its potential 
achievement. 
The maximum and minimum values used were: ₹68,195 and ₹7,368 for per-capita consumption; 16 and 0 years of schooling 
for education; 85 and 25 years for life expectancy; 7 (that is, household possesses all seven items: toilet, kitchen, vent, pucca 
roof and floor, electricity, and inside water supply) and 0 (household has none of these seven items) for living conditions; 5 
(that is, a household knows all five types of persons — doctor, teacher, government officer, elected politician, police 
inspector — as part of its relatives/caste/community) and 0 (that is, a household does not know any of these types whether 
from within or outside its relatives/caste/community). 
Source: Own calculations from IHDS-2011 
 
  
Table 7.2: Human Development Index Values for India, by Social Group* 
 Scheduled 
Tribes 
Scheduled 
Castes 
OBC Hindus Muslims Non-
Muslim 
Upper Class 
All India 
       
HDIε=0 34.8 37.0 44.8 45.1 58.9 44.0 
HDIε=0.5 27.7 31.0 38.9 39.1 53.5 39.5 
 *Life Expectancy, Education, Income, Living Conditions, Social Networks.  
 Each household’s HDI= (1/5)×LEI+(1/5)×HEI+(1/5)×IQI+(1/5)×LCI+(1/5)×JPI 
 
  
Table 7.3: Predicted Performance Indices for Four Indicators by Social Group and Region 
 Education Consumption Living Conditions Social Networks 
All-India PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE 
Scheduled Tribe 48.2 -16.5 0.79 30.7 -12.9 1.6 61.2 -16.3 0.62 22.0 -6.2 0.65 
Scheduled Caste 50.3 -14.4 0.52 27.5 -16.1 1.0 65.4 -12.1 0.41 20.4 -7.9 0.43 
OBC Hindu 55.9 -8.8 0.44 34.3 -9.3 0.9 70.9 -6.6 0.35 21.5 -6.7 0.36 
Muslim 49.4 -15.3 0.61 31.4 -12.2 1.2 72.9 -4.7 0.48 24.0 -4.2 0.50 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 64.7   43.6   77.5   28.2   
North             
Scheduled Tribe 51.8 -14.0 2.73 32.9 -21.9 5.4 73.9 -11.0 2.15 16.4 -6.6 2.25 
Scheduled Caste 54.3 -11.5 0.94 35.7 -19.2 1.8 79.5 -5.5 0.74 19.2 -3.8 0.77 
OBC Hindu 62.2 -3.7 1.08 45.0 -9.8 2.1 84.9 -0.1 0.85 21.5 -1.5 0.89 
Muslim 54.5 -11.4 1.32 47.3 -7.5 2.6 80.3 -4.6 1.04 25.0 1.9 1.08 
Non-Muslim Upper Class 65.8   54.9   85.0   23.0   
Central             
Scheduled Tribe 38.8 -24.3 1.16 21.5 -13.8 2.3 44.6 -26.5 0.92 21.6 -4.4 0.96 
Scheduled Caste 42.7 -20.4 0.97 22.0 -13.3 1.9 50.1 -20.9 0.77 19.5 -6.4 0.80 
OBC Hindu 49.4 -13.7 0.81 26.2 -9.1 1.6 57.9 -13.1 0.64 21.5 -4.4 0.67 
Muslim 41.8 -21.3 1.08 24.4 -10.9 2.1 67.0 -4.1 0.85 21.8 -4.1 0.89 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 63.1   35.3   71.1   26.0   
East             
Scheduled Tribe 52.6 -10.5 1.26 36.2 3.9 2.5 68.1 -5.2 0.99 31.4 0.4 1.04 
Scheduled Caste 46.7 -16.4 1.14 21.8 -10.5 2.2 62.7 -10.6 0.90 19.3 -11.7 0.94 
OBC Hindu 54.5 -8.6 1.16 25.2 -7.2 2.3 64.1 -9.2 0.92 17.9 -13.2 0.95 
Muslim 44.6 -18.5 1.30 18.6 -13.8 2.6 64.2 -9.2 1.03 24.2 -6.9 1.07 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 63.2   32.4   73.3   31.1   
West             
Scheduled Tribe 51.4 -13.4 1.53 30.1 -7.0 3.0 60.9 -16.9 1.21 26.9 -7.3 1.26 
Scheduled Caste 57.2 -7.6 1.35 26.6 -10.4 2.7 73.0 -4.8 1.07 26.2 -8.1 1.11 
OBC Hindu 57.3 -7.6 0.98 31.8 -5.2 1.9 75.9 -1.9 0.78 26.5 -7.7 0.81 
Muslim 49.8 -15.1 1.78 25.4 -11.7 3.5 73.7 -4.1 1.41 24.5 -9.8 1.47 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 64.9   37.1   77.8   34.2   
South             
Scheduled Tribe 52.0 -14.7 1.55 36.7 -19.4 3.1 67.8 -14.8 1.23 17.8 -11.5 1.28 
Scheduled Caste 54.6 -12.1 1.04 32.2 -23.9 2.0 71.1 -11.4 0.82 19.5 -9.8 0.85 
OBC Hindu 59.1 -7.6 0.82 43.3 -12.8 1.6 77.9 -4.7 0.64 20.8 -8.5 0.67 
Muslim 57.7 -9.1 1.17 40.0 -16.1 2.3 79.6 -2.9 0.92 25.6 -3.8 0.96 
Non-Muslim Upper Class [R] 66.7   56.1   82.5   29.3   
[R] denotes reference group 
Predicted values computed from SURE estimates on data for 37,247 households. 
PPI=predicted performance Index; MPI=marginal predicted performance index; SE=standard error. 
Source: Own Calculations from IHDS-2011 
 
 
Table 7.4: Predicted Performance Indices for Four Indicators by Region and Social Group  
 Education Consumption Living Conditions Social Networks 
All-India PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE PPI MPI SE 
North 59.9 9.8 0.55 45.7 17.8 1.08 82.1 22.5 0.43 21.5 -1.0 0.45 
Central [R] 50.1 
  
27.8   59.6   22.5   
East 54.2 4.1 0.51 27.4 -0.5 1.00 66.5 7.0 0.40 23.8 1.3 0.42 
West 58.0 7.9 0.52 32.0 4.2 1.02 74.0 14.4 0.41 28.5 6.0 0.42 
South 59.6 9.5 0.44 44.3 16.5 0.86 76.9 17.3 0.35 23.2 0.7 0.36 
Scheduled Tribe 
   
         
North 51.8 13.0 2.87 32.9 11.5 5.64 73.9 29.3 2.26 16.4 -5.2 2.36 
Central [R] 38.8 
  
21.5   44.6   21.6   
East 52.6 13.8 1.28 36.2 14.8 2.53 68.1 23.5 1.01 31.4 9.8 1.06 
West 51.4 12.6 1.55 30.1 8.6 3.05 60.9 16.3 1.22 26.9 5.3 1.28 
South 52.0 13.2 1.61 36.7 15.2 3.16 67.8 23.2 1.27 17.8 -3.8 1.32 
Scheduled Caste 
   
         
North 54.3 11.6 1.00 35.7 13.6 1.96 79.5 29.4 0.79 19.2 -0.3 0.82 
Central [R] 42.7 
  
22.0   50.1   19.5   
East 46.7 4.0 1.08 21.8 -0.2 2.13 62.7 12.6 0.85 19.3 -0.2 0.89 
West 57.2 14.5 1.35 26.6 4.6 2.65 73.0 22.8 1.06 26.2 6.6 1.11 
South 54.6 11.9 1.04 32.2 10.2 2.04 71.1 21.0 0.82 19.5 0.0 0.85 
OBC Hindu 
   
         
North 62.2 12.7 1.01 45.0 18.8 1.99 84.9 26.9 0.80 21.5 0.0 0.83 
Central [R] 49.4 
  
26.2   57.9   21.5   
East 54.5 5.1 0.98 25.2 -1.0 1.92 64.1 6.2 0.77 17.9 -3.6 0.80 
West 57.3 7.8 0.83 31.8 5.6 1.62 75.9 18.0 0.65 26.5 5.0 0.68 
South 59.1 9.7 0.65 43.3 17.1 1.28 77.9 19.9 0.51 20.8 -0.7 0.53 
Muslim 
   
         
North 54.5 12.7 1.44 47.3 23.0 2.83 80.3 13.4 1.13 25.0 3.1 1.18 
Central [R] 41.8 
  
24.4   67.0   21.8   
East 44.6 2.9 1.33 18.6 -5.8 2.61 64.2 -2.8 1.05 24.2 2.4 1.09 
West 49.8 8.0 1.82 25.4 1.1 3.58 73.7 6.7 1.44 24.5 2.6 1.50 
South 57.7 15.9 1.22 40.0 15.7 2.41 79.6 12.7 0.97 25.6 3.7 1.01 
Non-Muslim Upper Class 
   
         
North 65.8 2.7 0.85 54.9 19.6 1.66 85.0 13.9 0.67 23.0 -2.9 0.70 
Central [R] 63.1 
  
35.3   71.1   26.0   
East 63.2 0.1 0.99 32.4 -2.9 1.94 73.3 2.3 0.78 31.1 5.1 0.81 
West 64.9 1.8 0.93 37.1 1.8 1.83 77.8 6.7 0.73 34.2 8.3 0.76 
South 66.7 3.7 0.94 56.1 20.8 1.85 82.5 11.5 0.74 29.3 3.4 0.78 
[R] denotes reference region 
Predicted values computed from SURE estimates on data for 37,247 households. 
PPI=predicted performance Index; MPI=marginal predicted performance index; SE=standard error. 
Source: Own Calculations from IHDS-2011 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7.1 
The Equally Distributed Equivalent Wage 
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Figure 7.2: The Curvature of the Indifference Curves and the value of ε 
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